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We compute the value of a ﬁrm that pays its cash ﬂows each period through share repurchases in a dynamic
environment where personal taxes are paid on realized capital gains and dividends. These results provide a
measure of the personal tax advantages of equity ﬁnancing relative to debt ﬁnancing, which are often cited
as increasing the cost of debt. The initial price of the ﬁrm depends on the present value of the taxes paid,
which, in turn, depends on the initial price. We solve this valuation problem in closed form in a deterministic
setting and numerically in a stochastic setting. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant valuation effects from the tax protection
afforded by the equity basis. The tax savings are on the order of 40-50% of the taxes paid by the shareholders
of ﬁrm that distributes cash through dividends, and the cost of capital is reduced by approximately .8 to 1.2
percentage points through the use of repurchases relative to dividends.1 Introduction
The Modigliani and Miller (1963) model of capital structure choice under taxation still forms the theoreti-
cal basis for most pedagogy and practice in modern Finance, despite its obvious empirical and theoretical
limitations. This theory predicts a corner solution of all debt ﬁnancing for all ﬁrms, due to the deductibility
of interest payments at the corporate level. Such an outcome, however, appears grossly at variance with
observed practices and has never been taken seriously as a policy recommendation.
To explain this discrepancy, textbooks have followed researchers in pointing to three considerations that
are ignored in the Modigliani and Miller (hereafter, M&M) valuation of the tax shields from debt:
1. Costs of ﬁnancial distress
2. Redundancy of corporate tax shields
3. Tax advantages to equity at the level of personal taxes.
While considerable research has been devoted to all three of these lines of inquiry, and this research has en-
riched considerably our qualitative understanding of the tradeoffs involved, it has proved difﬁcult to generate
the sort quantitative results that could help researchers evaluate the empirical evidence or help practitioners
determine how much debt is too much debt.
With regard to the costs of distress, the M&M model takes as ﬁxed and exogenous the ﬁrm’s operating
policies, assets, and net cash ﬂows. It thus ignores the bankruptcy costs and incentive problems that may
distort real choices when the ﬁrm is in, or close to, bankruptcy. A great deal of research in the last two
decades has been devoted to this issue, and much has been learned about the ways incentive and informa-
tion problems can inﬂuence capital structure. Examples of this work include Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Myers (1977), Leland (1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999) and Moyen (1999). The stylized nature of the
models used to capture these tradeoffs, however, makes their quantitative importance difﬁcult to assess. Are
these costs sufﬁciently large to explain the low levels of debt ﬁnance ﬁrms employ? Or, are they relatively
insigniﬁcant when compared to the tax beneﬁts of debt, as suggested by the analogy in Miller (1977) to the
recipe for “horse and rabbit stew?”
Second, the M&M model surely overstates the tax beneﬁts of debt at the corporate level. The tax
shields from interest may, in some states of the world, be redundant, which lowers their expected value.
1They may also be risky, which lowers their present value. Models that qualitatively describe the tradeoffs
this would impose upon the ﬁrm go back to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), but the dynamic nature of
the treatment of tax shields in the tax code has made it difﬁcult to evaluate the quantitative importance of
these considerations. Considerable progress has been made on this front recently, using methods based on
simulation, in Graham (1996), and especially Graham (1998).
In this paper, we focus on the third factor that investigators have cited in arguing that M&M overstate
the tax beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing. Debt is tax-disadvantaged at the personal level. Interest payments are
taxed as ordinary income. Much of the compensation received by equity holders, on the other hand, comes
in the form of capital gains. Miller (1977) argued that this may raise the risk-adjusted cost of debt to the
ﬁrm, relative to equity, sufﬁciently to neutralize the tax advantages of debt at the corporate level.
The personal tax advantages of equity are largely attributable to the option to defer capital gains. The
value of this option, and thus the cost of equity capital to the ﬁrm, depends on the timing of the ﬁrm’s
cash distributions and the way those distributions are split between dividends and share repurchases. In
the interest of obtaining tractable expressions, however, researchers who have studied this problem in the
past have approached it with static models, making it very difﬁcult to evaluate the quantitative realism or
importance of the effects they describe. Miller (1977), for example, simply assumes payments to equity are
tax exempt. This is clearly not the case. Even if all cash is distributed through repurchases, investors may
have to realize capital gains in order for the distribution to take place. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) assume
a constant, exogenous personal tax rate on equity. Graham (1998) assumes the personal tax rate on equity is
a simple linear function of the dividend payout.
Our purpose here is to provide more quantitative guidance as to the magnitude and determinants of the
personal tax advantages of equity ﬁnancing to the ﬁrm in a dynamic model. The model follows the original
M&M approach of taking as exogenous the ﬁrm’s pre-tax net operating cash ﬂows. Thus, we abstract from
bankruptcy costs and incentive problems. We also ignore the complications at the corporate level studied by
Graham (1998). Our model is also partial equilibrium in the sense of taking as exogenous the pricing kernel.
Despite these obvious simpliﬁcations, this model allows us to pose and answer the following questions: In
an environment where the ﬁrm can issue debt or equity, and where it can distribute cash through repurchases
or dividends, how high is the risk-adjusted cost of equity relative to the risk-adjusted cost of debt? How
does this depend on the mix between debt and equity? How does it depend on the ﬁrm’s dividend policy?
2We address these questions, ﬁrst, in a setting that assumes certain and perpetual cash ﬂows. This allows
for closed-form expressions for the ﬁrm’s value, cost of capital, and the gains to leverage. These expressions
can be directly compared to the traditional analyses in M&M, and Miller (1977). The certainty case also
illustrates the logic we employ in our numerical analysis of the ﬁrm’s problem under uncertainty.
Next we describe methods for obtaining numerical solutions to the model when the ﬁrm’s net cash ﬂows
are random, but positive. Using these methods we calculate the value of the ﬁrm when all cash ﬂows are
distributed through repurchases. Comparisons of this value to the value under full dividend payout provides
measures of the effects of the personal tax advantages of equity on the ﬁrm’s cost of funds.
When net cash ﬂows can be negative, the state space for the valuation problem expands quickly, making
it difﬁcult to solve the model numerically. New shares issued to ﬁnance negative net cash ﬂows establish
new basis values, and the number of shares outstanding at all basis values must be tracked. To evaluate the
importance of these effects, we provide approximations by simulating the personal taxes paid assuming the
ﬁrm’s aggregate value evolves exogenously. We then compute the expected present value the taxes paid, and
numerically adjust the tax rate in the exogenous value process so that the basis values at which new shares
are issued approximately reﬂects the present value of future personal tax liabilities. For the cases where we
have full solutions to the model, this method provides reasonably accurate approximations. We then use
this method to evaluate the magnitude of the tax advantages provided by issuing new shares, at higher basis
values, as the ﬁrm moves through time.
Our results show that the personal-tax advantage of repurchases over dividends or interest payments
is substantial. The present value of tax savings are in the range of 40-50 percent of the present value of
the personal tax liability that would be incurred using only dividend payouts. The “implicit tax rates” we
calculate, rates which yield the same present value for the ﬁrm if all distributions were fully taxed, are
generally around 60 percent of the tax rate faced by the the ﬁrm’s shareholders.
To focus directly on the personal-tax consequences of the ﬁrm’s cash distribution policies, we abstract
from a number of considerations that have been important in other research on capital gains taxation.
We ignore liquidity needs or portfolio rebalancing that may lead individual investors to realize gains
even if it is disadvantageous from a tax standpoint to do so. The only motive in our model for realizing
gains is to facilitate the ﬁrm’s need to disgorge cash, and the ﬁrm repurchases shares at a price that fully
compensates the selling shareholder for surrendering the opportunity to continue deferring. In contrast, a
3large literature in public economics studies the effects taxation based on realization rather than an accrual
has on the “effective tax rate” faced by individual investors. (See Poterba (1999) for a recent summary of
these results in the context of the measurement of after-tax returns for investors.) Forexample, Bailey (1969)
ﬁnds that the option to defer gains reduces their effective taxation by roughly a half, and the opportunity to
step up the basis on death reduces it by another half, leading to effective taxation at a rate one-fourth of the
statutory rate. This approximation has, in turn, been carried through by many authors, though Balcer and
Judd (1987) criticizes this approach. In their dynamic model no constant, proportional, “implicit” rate exists
that gives rise to the same investment and consumption behavior as capital gains taxation on a realization
basis.
Our results, since they ignore any other motives for realization, can be viewed as estimating the effect of
the ﬁrm’s need to distribute cash on the implicit rate at which capital gains are taxed. To the extent that other
motives exist, our results will understate the total tax burden born by equity holders, and hence the advantage
of equity repurchases relative to dividends or debt. Similarly, in order to focus purely on the effects of the
ﬁrm’s distribution policies, we assume the rates at which dividends, interest, and capital gains are taxed are
identical, and abstract from the distinction between long- and short-term gains. These assumptions will lead
us to undervalue the personal-tax beneﬁts of equity ﬁnancing. We also take the net cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm as
exogenous. This abstracts from the ﬁrm’s ability to retain funds to delay taxation at the personal level.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section we evaluate the value the ﬁrm and determine its
cost of funds under certainty. In Section 3 we provide numerical solutions to the valuation problem under
uncertainty. In Section 4 we develop an approximation to the value when there are negative cash ﬂows by
simulating the personal tax liability when the dynamics of the ﬁrm’s value are taken as exogenous. Section 5
provides a brief summary of our conclusions. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The Certainty Case
Before studying environments where closed-form solutions are inaccessible, it is helpful to ﬁrst understand
the simplest cases and examples. We begin, therefore, by evaluating the dynamics of the stock price, number
of shares outstanding, ﬁrm value, and cost of capital under a certainty model for the ﬁrm’s net cash ﬂows.
We assume these cash ﬂows are constant and perpetual, as in M&M,or that the cash ﬂows grow at a constant
rate. We will provide solutions for each of the following cases, in order of complexity.
41. Full, or zero, taxation of all distributions. This covers the cases of full dividend payout, no taxation at
the personal level, and taxation of all capital gains whether realized or deferred.
2. Personal taxes paid only when gains are realized.
3. Debt is tax deductible at the corporate level, while personal taxes are paid on capital gains only on
realization.
4. Cash ﬂows grow at a constant rate, while personal taxes paid only when gains are realized.
Throughout, we assume that interest, dividends, and realized capital gains are taxed at the same rate at
the personal level. For cases 1 and 2, we assume the ﬁrm is entirely equity ﬁnanced. The ﬁrm’s cost of
capital, then, is the cost of equity. The cash ﬂows the ﬁrm pays out should be viewed as net cash ﬂow, after
corporate taxes. When we consider the third case, we treat corporate taxes explicitly.
The ﬁrm can be viewed as simply a sequence of certain, perpetual cash ﬂows, Ct, paid at periodic










￿ ¥. This cash ﬂow, and the investment and operating activities that produce
it, are viewed as exogenous. Thus, we consider only the ﬁnancial activities of the ﬁrm, and ignore the
possibility that it may wish to retain funds to shield or defer taxation at the personal level. Again, these
simplifying assumptions are in keeping with the benchmark case provided by M&M.
Let the value of the ﬁrm at time t be Vt, the price per share be pt, and the number of shares outstanding
nt. When the ﬁrm is initially established, n0 shares are issued. The ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows will be paid out either
as dividends or through repurchases of the shares initially issued. After this date, as the ﬁrm’s net cash ﬂows
are always positive, no new shares are issued.
We ignore consumption or portfolio rebalancing as motives for trade. We also abstract from the distinc-
tion between long-term and short-term capital gains. Further, all investors face the same constant after-tax
discount rate, r
￿ 0. Thus, investors can be viewed as homogeneous, and will not trade privately in equilib-
rium as long as the price sequence is increasing through time. It will never beneﬁt an individual shareholder
realize a capital gain, pay taxes in the current period, and then reset the basis to shield income in the future.
Deferring the gain instead provides a tax-free loan from the government. By similar reasoning, a buyer will
not be willing to pay what a seller would demand for her shares, unless the buyer was motivated by some
other consideration such as desire for consumption or portfolio rebalancing. Since taxes incurred through
a transaction will be reﬂected in the price at which the transaction is executed, if the taxes represent a net
5loss to the traders, one of them must ﬁnd the trade unattractive at any price the other ﬁnds acceptable. The
next lemma establishes this result formally. It will be the basis for our arguments later that we can focus
exclusively on the trades between the ﬁrm and its initial shareholders. The proof, which is provided in the
Appendix, simply relies on the argument that for any feasible realization strategy, the beneﬁts associated
with future tax deductions from the step up of the basis will have a lower present value than the taxes that
must be paid now to achieve that increase in the basis.
Lemma 1 Suppose the current price exceeds the initial price at which the shares were issued, pt
￿
po, and
that all current equity claimants hold the shares with a tax basis of po. Then a new shareholder would
be willing to buy shares at pt only if that price is less than or equal to the minimum price an existing
shareholder would accept for her shares.
2.1 Benchmark Cases
The next proposition provides formulas for the ﬁrm’s value and share price dynamics, when there are no
taxes or when taxation is symmetric for capital gains and dividends. In keeping with the M&M model, we
view the cash ﬂows as constant: Ct
￿ C. The algebra leading to these formulas, is detailed in the Appendix.
Let pc
t denote the cum-dividend price, and let pe
t be the ex-dividend price.
Proposition 1 When capital gains are taxed each period, whether realized or deferred, and dividends are
taxed as ordinary income, the price per share and number of shares obey the following dynamics:
1. When cash ﬂows are paid as dividends, the number of shares, cum-dividend price, and ex-dividend

































62. When cash ﬂows are used for repurchases, the price per share grows geometrically and the number



































These formulas include the special case of no taxation when tp
￿ 0, in which case the number of shares
shrinks, and the price grows, at rate r.
The proposition shows that, when capital gains are taxed whether realized or deferred, the decision to
distribute cash by dividend or capital gain has no effect on aggregate ﬁrm value or aggregate personal tax
liability. The shares actually repurchased in the distribution are only partially taxed, due to protection from
the basis. In the M&M setting, however, the aggregate capital gain on all outstanding shares is precisely
equal to the amount of the distribution, and hence the aggregate tax liability is the same as it would be under
full dividend payout.
2.2 Repurchases when Taxes are Paid On Realized Gains Only
When capital gains are not taxed when earned, but rather when realized, there is a wedge between the value
of a share to a purchaser, who establishes a new basis at the current price, and the value to a shareholder who
holds the share at a lower basis. In our model, there is no motive to trade other than to distribute cash from
the ﬁrm. Lemma 1 implies that if the price is increasing, the price demanded by an existing shareholder,
with an embedded gain, exceeds the price a new, private buyer would be willing to pay. Thus, the ﬁrm issues
shares only at its founding, and all shareholders hold the shares with the same basis, po. We will assume
that the price the ﬁrm pays for the shares it repurchases fully compensates the shareholder for the loss of
the opportunity to defer. Then Lemma 1 implies that this price does, in fact, exceed what a private buyer
7would be willing to pay. Note that the one point where a new buyer and a seller would view the shares
symmetrically is at the initial date, since selling the shares at po triggers no tax liability.
We normalize the number of shares originally issued to n0









since the value of the shares repurchased must equal the cash used to repurchase them. Thus, nt is the
number of shares prevailing between the distribution at time t and the distribution at t
￿ 1.






































Given a price series satisfying this equation at each point in time, a shareholder is, by recursive argument,
indifferent between selling shares back to the ﬁrm immediately or deferring the gain to an arbitrary point in
the future.































where q and the initial value of the equity, po, are coefﬁcients to be determined. Evaluating the stock price





















We can now establish the initial value of the ﬁrm, po. Since buyers and sellers will view the shares
symmetrically at this point, this price must simply be the present value of the aggregate after-tax cash ﬂows
to the equity holders. The after-tax cash ﬂows accruing to initial equity holders at time t are the after-tax





































































The ﬁrst line uses the constraint that the value of the shares repurchased must equal the cash distributed,
equation (6). The third line uses this constraint again, and the fourth line uses the solution for the price, (9).
The limit, as t
￿ ¥, of the right-hand side of (10) is Ct
￿ 1
￿ tp
￿ . As time passes, the aggregate value
of the protection afforded by the initial basis becomes trivially small. The share price rises at close to a
geometric rate as shares are extinguished through repurchases. In the limit, therefore, the distribution is
fully taxed.
The derivation to this point allows for any deterministic pattern of positive cash ﬂows over time. When








































9The following proposition summarizes the solution.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the personal tax rate is tp, the after tax discount factor is r and that the ﬁrm

































































































A counterintuitive feature of the solution is that the value of ﬁrm converges to the no tax value over time,
while the after tax cash ﬂows the shareholders receive converges to
￿ 1
￿ tp
￿ C, the full tax cash ﬂows. At
the equilibrium prices, the investor must be indifferent between selling his shares today and paying taxes on
the accumulated capital gains, or holding the shares indeﬁnitely. The higher the current price, the higher the
price the investor will require to be indifferent between selling today and holding forever. In the limit, as
the accumulated capital gains rise, they must receive a price for their holdings equal to what the shares are
worth to an investor in an world without taxes.




















10The personal-tax advantage of equity, in this setting, is manifest in the fact that the personal tax rate is
subtracted in the “discount factors” in equation (12), but not in (16).
By truncating the inﬁnite sum in (12), these expressions can be compared quantitatively. Figure 1 plots




￿ po as a fraction of the present value of
taxes paid under dividends, tpC
￿ r, for a ﬁrm with cash ﬂow of 100. The value of the ﬁrm, po is computed
with 500 terms in the summation. The ﬁgure plots these ratios against the personal tax rate, using three
different values for the after-tax discount rate, 3% (+), 6% (*), and 9% (x). In each case, repurchases save
the ﬁrm’s shareholders 40-50% in the present value of their tax liability.
The ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital is simply the discount rate that equates the initial value given above to






Figure 2 plots this cost of equity capital, assuming pre-tax return of 6%, for various levels of the tax rate
from 0 to 40%. The solid line is the cost of equity capital, in this case where C
￿ 1 just 1
po. The dotted line






2.3 Allowing for Growth
Our formulas for the initial value of the ﬁrm generalize in a straightforward manner to the case of constant
growth in the cash ﬂows. Up to equation (10), the derivation applies to any positive, deterministic series of
net cash ﬂows. If these cash ﬂows grow at a constant rate, g, with an initial cash ﬂow at date t=1 of C, we





















Table 1 provides measures of the tax advantage to repurchases versus dividends under different growth
rates. In the table, the implict tax rate is the rate that equates the present value of the fully taxed cash ﬂows











￿ . The percent of PV taxes is computed
by calculating the present value of taxes paid as a percentage of the present value of taxes paid under
full, proportional taxation. The table shows quite clearly that the advantages of repurchases over dividend
payments decrease with the rate of growth in the cash ﬂows, despite the fact that the growth in the ﬁrm’s
11cash ﬂows is reﬂected in the present value that determines the initial basis.
Growth rates
0% 2% 4%
Panel A: Tax rate of 28%
Implicit tax rate (%) 15.98 18.60 23.84
Percent of PV taxes (%) 57.06 66.41 85.16
Panel B: Tax rate of 35%
Implicit tax rate (%) 20.58 23.75 29.60
Percent of PV taxes (%) 57.06 66.41 85.16
Table 1: Tax Advantage to Repurchases Under Certainty: The implicit tax rate is the rate that, under full
taxation, would set the present value of after-tax cash ﬂows equal to their calculated value. The percent of
PV taxes is the present value of expected taxes paid, as a percentage of the present value of taxes paid under
full taxation. The after-tax discount rate is 6%, and the value of the ﬁrm is computed using 200 periods.
2.4 Allowing for Debt Financing
To account for debt ﬁnancing, and quantify the tax advantage of debt net of personal taxes, we must allow
for taxation at the corporate level. Thus, we now interpret C as the ﬁrm’s earnings before interest and taxes,
EBIT,as in M&M.The net after-corporate tax operating cash ﬂowis thenC
￿ 1
￿ tc
￿ , where tc isthe corporate
tax rate. We assume interest expense and dividend payments are constant and perpetual. Let i
￿ it be the
interest paid by the ﬁrm in period t, and let d
￿ dt be the dividend payment. A ﬁrm paying interest of i






￿ available to distribute to equity holders. This will be divided between
dividends and repurchases. The valuation of dividends and interest payments, which are both fully taxed
at the personal level, is straightforward. The value of the ﬁrm’s debt is the present value of the interest








￿ r. The analysis of
the previous section, speciﬁcally equation (12), gives the value of the perpetual stream of repurchases as a









































12This can be written as the value of an unlevered ﬁrm, with all cash distributed through repurchases, as in




























































This equation is linear in both i and d, so that dividend policy and capital structure policy will be charac-




in equation (20) is unambiguously negative for any tp
￿ 0. The relative attractiveness of debt versus equity
(with repurchases) is determined by the relative magnitudes of r, tp, and tc. Assuming d
￿ 0, we can rewrite










































where DL is the value of the debt. The term multiplying DL is the gain to leverage, and can be instructively













In our setting the ﬂows to equity are not taxed at a preferential rate. Rather the personal-tax advantage to
equity comes from the present value of the tax shields from the initial basis.
While providing a quantitative benchmark for the personal tax advantages of equity, this analysis will
not, of itself, rationalize interior capital structures at realistic values of the parameters. Our intent is, rather,
to gain a better understanding of how large other costs of debt, such as losses in aggregate value associated
with ﬁnancial distress, would have to be to generate interior optima. We can rewrite the gain to leverage,








































































￿ 1, the following lemma follows
by inspection of the numerator.




￿ tc the gain to leverage is positive.
Inspection of (22) suggests, indeed, that the personal tax rate must be substantially higher than the
corporate rate to offset the beneﬁts of deductions at the corporate level. Figure 3 provides a quantitative
sense of this. The ﬁgure plots the corporate tax rate at which the gain to leverage is zero, for different values
of the personal tax rate. For a given personal tax rate, at corporate rates above the curve plotted in the ﬁgure,
the ﬁrm would prefer debt ﬁnancing over equity ﬁnancing.
Equation (19) for the value of the ﬁrm can also be used to evaluate the effects of capital structure and
dividend policy on the ﬁrm’s overall cost of capital. In a manner analogous to M&M, we ask what discount
rate sets the present value of future after-corporate-tax, operating cash ﬂow equal to the value of the ﬁrm.









whereVL is computed using (19). Table 2 reports the results of these computations for a ﬁrm with tc
￿ 34%,
r
￿ 6%, and two values of the personal tax rate, 28% and 35%.
3 Uncertain Cash Flows
When cash ﬂows are certain, in a setting parallel to that envisioned by M&M, we can solve for the value of
the ﬁrm under repurchases in closed form. The advantage repurchases provide over dividends is attributable,
in our setting, entirely to the tax shield supplied by the initial basis. It takes a mathematically simple form
as a reduction in the discount factors attributable to after-tax cash ﬂows (see equations (12) and (16)). We
found that this advantage to repurchases is quantitatively substantial for reasonable parameter values, 40-
50% of the value of the personal tax liability. It was not, however, sufﬁciently large to completely offset the
advantages at the corporate level of debt that, as assumed by M&M, offers full, non-redundant tax shields at
the corporate level.
Our purpose in this section is to evaluate whether these implications hold when cash ﬂows are uncertain.
We continue to make assumptions analogous to M&M. We view the ﬁrm as a perpetual stream of pre-tax
14Dividend Payout Ratio
Interest over EBIT 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Panel A: tp
￿ 28%
0% 7.14 7.35 7.57 7.81 8.06 8.33
20% 6.74 6.89 7.04 7.21 7.38 7.55
40% 6.38 6.48 6.58 6.69 6.80 6.91
60% 6.06 6.12 6.18 6.24 6.30 6.37
80% 5.77 5.79 5.82 5.85 5.87 5.90
100% 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
Panel B: tp
￿ 35%
0% 7.55 7.84 8.15 8.48 8.84 9.23
20% 7.21 7.41 7.63 7.86 8.11 8.37
40% 6.89 7.03 7.18 7.33 7.49 7.65
60% 6.60 6.69 6.78 6.87 6.96 7.05
80% 6.34 6.38 6.42 6.46 6.50 6.54
100% 6.09 6.09 6.09 6.09 6.09 6.09
Table 2: Cost of Capital Calculations: The body of the table reports the percentage return that equates
the value of the ﬁrm to present value of after-tax operating cash ﬂows. Rows represent different capital
structures, parameterized by the percentage of pre-tax income paid in interest. Columns represent different
dividend policies, parameterized by the percentage of after-tax cash ﬂow paid in dividends. The corporate
tax rate is assumed to be 34%, the personal rate is 28% or 35%, and the after-tax discount rate is 6%.
net cash ﬂows that are constant in expectation. Thus, when cash ﬂows are paid as dividends, or when all









where ˆ C is the expected cash ﬂow under the risk-neutral measure. Let Cs
t denote cash ﬂow in state s at date
t. For simplicity, we take the state space to be ﬁnite and discrete, and assume net cash ﬂows are independent
and identically distributed through time. Denote the risk-neutral probability of cash ﬂowCs
t as ps.
When net cash ﬂows are always positive, we solve numerically for the value of the ﬁrm. With positive
net cash ﬂows, as under certainty, shares are only issued once, and so the basis is the same for all outstanding
shares. If the price always rises through time, as shares are retired, then this basis will always be the initial
price. The only state variables on which prices will depend are the current cash ﬂow,Ct, and the number of
shares outstanding, nt
￿ 1. For the no-tax case, it is simple to verify analytically that the price always rises
15when net cash ﬂows are positive.1 While we have not found a proof for the general case, we can verify
numerically that along the worst sample paths, where the lowest (but still positive) cash ﬂow is realized, the
price increases through time with the repurchases.
While the decision rules for the ﬁrm are mechanical in this model, the share price must be determined
endogenously. The price a shareholder will demand when the ﬁrm offers to repurchase shares will depend
on the shareholder’s basis, and on the present value of future taxes paid if she decides not to sell her shares
back to the ﬁrm, which in turn will depend on the future price path. Suppose at date t we enter the period
with nt
￿ 1 shares outstanding. If we know the price next period will be set so that a shareholder with basis po
will be just indifferent between continuing to hold the shares and selling into the repurchase, then the price






























Finally, as there is no distribution at the initial date, t









































































































































These three equations, (24), (25), and (27), must be solved to determine the value of the ﬁrm, and the
paths of the price and the number of shares.
As the ﬁrm proceeds through time, the number of shares is shrinking and the price per share is growing,
both at roughly geometric rates. Therefore, it is more straightforward numerically to deal with analogous
equations for the value of the ﬁrm. Examining the value also provides some insight into the dynamics of the
tax liability and its impact on prices.
On entering period t, the ﬁrm knows the number of shares outstanding, nt
￿ 1, and the initial basis, po.
Once the random cash ﬂow is known, pt and nt are determined. We will derive a recursion for the value
of the ﬁrm, after the current cash ﬂow is known, but before the payment is made. The ﬁrm value is given
by nt
￿ 1pt, before the distribution, and by ntpt immediately after. Denote the number of shares repurchased
over the period by Dt
6 nt
￿ 1






















































￿ be the value of the ﬁrm at the beginning of the period, with current cash ﬂow c and current
number of shares n, let D
￿ c
￿ n
￿ be the number of shares repurchased over the period, and let n
9 denote the
number of shares next period and c
9 the cash ﬂow next period. Using this recursive notation, equation (28)












































































































Equation (31) is a functional equation that must be satisﬁed by V
￿ c
￿ n
￿ , and so the solution is a ﬁxed–point
to equation (31). Assuming the ﬁrm begins with one share, and noting that there is no distribution between
t













































Thus, wecan solve for the value of the ﬁrmand the initial price by seeking a ﬁxed point,V
￿ c
￿ n
￿ , to equations
(31) and equation (33).





































  equal to the no tax value for n
F n, since as we show later, the value of the ﬁrm must
converge to the no–tax value as the number of shares goes to zero. We then guess the initial price, and




0 respectively. Using these on the
right-hand side of equation (31), we solve for the ﬁrm value, which we denote V i
￿ c
￿ n
￿ . This step involves
solving a quadratic equation at each point
￿ c
￿ n
￿ . We can then use equation (30) to calculate the number of












































These steps are repeated until we arrive at an approximate ﬁxed point. In practice, this procedure converges
relatively quickly.
Table 3 provides numerical results obtained using this procedure for a ﬁrm with expected cash ﬂows of
100. In each case there are two possible cash ﬂows, and probability of the higher cash ﬂow is 2
￿ 3. The
after-tax discount rate is 6%, and two values for tp are used, 28% and 35%.
The table provides various descriptive measures of the effects of personal taxation on the value. The
second column gives the tax rate that sets the present value of after-tax cash ﬂows, assuming they were fully











￿ . In every case, this implicit tax rate is substantially lower than the tax rate on dividends. The third row
measures the impact of the tax advantages to equity on the cost of funds to the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd the discount





The difference between this cost of capital and the pre-tax cost of capital under dividends is in every case
substantial, between 0.79 and 1.21 percentage points. The ﬁnal row reports the present value of personal
taxes paid as a fraction of the present value of the tax liability under full dividend payout.
From this table we see that, as in the certainty case, the use of repurchases over dividends reduces the
present value of the shareholders’ personal tax liability by 40% to 50%. There is very little variation in
the quantities of interest across cash-ﬂow outcomes of different volatility. This is not surprising, given the









Panel A: Tax rate of 28%
Value 1,200.00 1,403.73 1,402.01 1,666.67
Implicit tax rate (%) 28.00 15.78 15.88 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 8.33 7.12 7.13 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 56.34 56.71 0.00
Panel B: Tax rate of 35%
Value 1,083.33 1,327.71 1,325.45 1,666.67
Implicit tax rate (%) 35.00 20.34 20.47 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 8.33 7.53 7.54 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 58.11 58.49 0.00
Table 3: Numerical Measures of Tax Advantage to Equity: The implicit tax rate is the rate that, under
full taxation, would set the present value of after-tax cash ﬂows equal to their calculated value. The cost
of capital is the discount rate that sets the present value of the pre-tax, expected cash ﬂows equal to the
calculated value. The percent of PV taxes is the present value of expected taxes paid, as a percentage of the
present value of taxes paid under full taxation. The tax rate is assumed to be 35%, the expected net cash
ﬂow before personal tax is 100, and the after-tax discount rate is 6%.
































Increases in volatility would affect the value through the effects of correlation between Ct
￿ i and pt
￿ i on
the expectation of their quotient, and through Jensen’s inequality. Since the price is growing geometrically,
however, these effects become relatively unimportant very quickly. The ﬁrm’s value is not sufﬁciently non-
linear in the cash ﬂows for the volatility to have a signiﬁcant effect, when the cash ﬂows are uniformly
positive.
Equation (38) also makes clear that the value of the ﬁrm must, as time advances, approach the no tax
value. The number of shares is steadily decreasing, as cash is distributed through repurchases, so the middle






























From this expression it is obvious that as the number of shares outstanding approaches zero, the distribution
becomes fully taxed. The price at which shares are being repurchased grows, and a smaller fraction of the
distribution is shielded by the basis. These outcomes are consistent, however. The ﬁrm repurchases shares
from its owners at a price that leaves them indifferent between selling, and incurring capital gains tax, and
deferring. Since the option to defer indeﬁnitely is always available, the higher the immediate tax liability on
realization, the higher a price the shareholders demand until, in the limit, they receive a price equal to what
the shares would be worth to new, private buyers in an untaxed world.
4 Uncertain, Negative Net Cash Flows
We next investigate the effect of negative net cash ﬂows on the personal tax liability of the ﬁrm’s sharehold-
ers. When the ﬁrm has negative net cash ﬂow, and must issue new shares, these shares will be issued at the
prevailing price, which may be considerably higher than the initial price. This, in turn, will create new tax
shields, through higher basis shares, and lower the subsequent aggregate tax burden for shareholders.
Unfortunately, a full numerical solution to this problem is computationally unmanageable, because of
the path dependencies and expansion of the state space due to the need to track the tax basis at which all
outstanding shares are held. In order to evaluate quantitatively the value of personal taxes paid in this situa-
tion, we approximate the dynamics of the quantities of interest and estimate their values through simulation.
The exercise is similar in spirit to, although considerably less complicated than, the approach employed in
Graham (1996). This method can also be easily adapted to accomodate growth in the ﬁrm’s pre-tax net cash
ﬂows.
4.1 The M&M Case of Constant Expected Cash Flows










21for a given tax rate to. Using this ex-distribution value, we simulate a sample path for the ﬁrm’s net cash
ﬂows before personal tax under the risk-neutral measure, and create a corresponding sample path for the
stock price and number of shares. The the price per share at date t is given by the following laws of motion

























F 0, shares will be issued. To determine the taxes paid along the sample path, we assume that
if the current price is less than the basis at which any shares are currently held, all those shares have their
basis reset at the current price and pay negative taxes of tp times the associated capital loss. If shares are
repurchased, we assume the highest basis shares are tendered ﬁrst and repurchased. The only taxes paid
along a sample path are the positive taxes associated with gains realized in a repurchase, and the negative
taxes paid when the price drops below the level of the basis on shares outstanding, occasioning a capital
loss. If the ﬁrm experiences a negative cash ﬂow, but the price exceeds all outstanding basis values, new
shares are issued but taxes are zero for that date.
Since the probabilities used in drawing cash ﬂows are those associated with the risk neutral measure,
we can draw many sample paths, and average the taxes paid across them for at a given date t, to estimate
the expected taxes paid under the risk-neutral measure. We then discount this average for t periods to
determine a present value of taxes paid in period t. Adding these present values gives the present value of
expected taxes paid. Denote this quantity as PVTAX
￿ to
￿ . Note that this quantity depends on the tax rate
used to compute the exogenous ex-distribution value we assumed initially. For example, if we use tp to
compute VF, we will understate the ex-distribution value and, thus, understate the initial basis and overstate
subsequent taxes triggered by repurchases.
To minimize these effects, we adjust the tax rate used to compute VF
￿ t
￿ . Under full taxation at rate t
the present value of taxes paid is just t ˆ C
￿ r. We solve for the tax rate at which this quantity is equal to the








22We then repeat the simulation, calculate PVTAX
￿ t1
￿ , and iterate in this way until we ﬁnd that tk
P tk
￿ 1.









This approximation will give average taxes paid that are similar in magnitude to what we would expect
under a full solution for the equilibrium value of the ﬁrm. It will distort somewhat, however, the time path
of taxes paid. A check on the accuracy of the method can be made by implementing the approximation in
the certainty case, where we have an analytical solution for the equilibrium value, and in the case where
cash ﬂows are all positive, where we have a numerical solution for the initial price. This exercise suggests
the approximation is quite accurate.
Table 4 provides results on the taxes paid under this approximation for the dynamics of ﬁrm value. We
assume there are two states for the pre-tax cash ﬂow, which has an expected value of 100 in every period.
Thus, the model conforms to the M&M assumption of constant, perpetual expected cash ﬂow. The after-tax
discount rate is assumed to be 6%. The table reports results for two tax rates and two levels of volatility
for the cash ﬂows. It reports the same measures of the tax beneﬁts of equity with repurchases as previously
reported for the cases of certainty and positive cash ﬂows.
The difference between the cost of capital under repurchases and the pre-tax cost of capital under divi-
dends is in every case substantial. The implicit tax rate on equity ﬂows is, again, substantially lower than the
personal tax rate, and the difference increases as the personal tax rate increases. The estimated present value
of personal taxes paid as a fraction of the present value of the tax liability under full dividend payout varies
between 55% and 65%. Over all, the magnitudes in Table 4 are similar to those reported for the certainty
case, and for the case where cash ﬂows are strictly positive. The effective tax rate on ﬂows to equity holders
is, for example, close to 20% when dividends are taxed at 35%. Thus, it appears that the tax shields afforded
by the original basis reduce the personal tax burden quite dramatically, but the equity is also far from tax
free as assumed in Miller (1977).
The present value of the tax liability appears to increase somewhat with the volatility of the cash ﬂows.
This may seem surprising given that shareholders, who have freedom to defer or realize gains and losses,
have an option-like claim on their shares. The shape of the equity holders’ tax liability is ambiguous,













Panel A: Tax rate of 28%
Value 1,200.00 1,392.76 1,402.52 1,666.67
Implicit tax rate (%) 28.00 16.45 15.91 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 8.33 7.18 7.13 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 58.73 56.81 0.00
Panel B: Tax rate of 35%
Value 1,083.33 1,315.79 1,324.50 1,666.67
Implicit tax rate (%) 35.00 21.02 20.61 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 8.33 7.60 7.55 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 60.05 58.83 0.00
Table 4: Cost of Capital and Implicit Tax Rates with Negative Cash Flows:The implicit tax rate is that
rate that, under full taxation would set the present value of the after–tax cash ﬂows equal to their calculated
value. The cost of capital is the discount rate that sets the present value of of the pre–tax, expected cash
ﬂows equal to the calculated value. The percent of PV taxes is the present value of the of taxes paid, as a
percentage of the the present value of the taxes paid under full taxation. taxes paid assuming fully taxed
dividends. Calculations assume an after-tax discount rate of 6%, and that the probability of the higher cash
ﬂow is two-thirds. The simulations used to estimate the present value of taxes paid were carried out over
200 periods, with 2,000 sample paths for each case.
side of (39). It is linear in the cash ﬂow, with a slope of
￿ 1
￿ tp




￿ tppo. If the
ﬁrm has a negative cash ﬂow, and the price exceeds the basis values of outstanding shares, the after-tax cash
ﬂow is justCt. When the price drops below basis values, there are negative taxes. In the simulations reported










D , which is concave
and therefore will have a value that decreases with the volatility of the cash ﬂows. This effect appears to
dominate in the numerical results.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the time path of taxes paid. Figure 4 shows the taxes paid in each period, as a
fraction of the cash ﬂow, under certainty, using Ct
￿ 100, tp
￿ 35%, and other parameters the same as in
Table 4. The taxes are small initially because of the tax shield supplied by the original basis. As shares
are repurchased, the share price grows, and the tax shield from the basis becomes negligible. Within 50
periods, the ﬂows are being taxed at close to the full 35% rate. Figure 5 shows that with uncertainty and
the possibility of negative cash ﬂows a similar pattern emerges. In it we plot the average taxes (under the
24martingale measure) paid in each period, across sample paths in the simulation reported in the third line of
Table 4.
Finally, in Table 5 we provide information about the relative accuracy of our different methods of calcu-
lating or estimating the present value of the tax liability. When cash ﬂows are positive, we can compare the
approximation in this section to the numerical solutions reported in Section 3. Similarly, for the certainty
case, we can compare both the numerical solution and the approximation to the closed-form solution. The
table shows that the approximation understates the present value of the tax liability, but this bias is of similar








Approx. Numerical Closed-Form Approx. Numerical
Panel A: Tax rate of 28%
Value 1,407.99 1,404.81 1,400.40 1,407.06 1,403.73
Implicit tax rate (%) 15.52 15.71 15.98 15.58 15.78
Cost of capital (%) 7.10 7.12 7.14 7.11 7.12
Percent of PV taxes (%) 55.43 55.11 57.06 55.63 56.34
Panel B: Tax rate of 35%
Value 1,336.15 1,328.39 1,323.70 1,336.09 1,327.71
Implicit tax rate (%) 19.83 20.30 20.58 19.83 20.34
Cost of capital (%) 7.48 7.53 7.55 7.48 7.53
Percent of PV taxes (%) 56.66 57.99 58.79 56.67 58.11
Table 5: Cost of Capital and Implicit Tax Rates with Negative Cash Flows: The implicit tax rate is that
rate that, under full taxation would set the present value of the after–tax cash ﬂows equal to their calculated
value. The cost of capital is the discount rate that sets the present value of of the pre–tax, expected cash
ﬂows equal to the calculated value. The percent of PV taxes is the present value of the of taxes paid, as a
percentage of the the present value of the taxes paid under full taxation. taxes paid assuming fully taxed
dividends. Calculations assume an after-tax discount rate of 6%, and that the probability of the higher cash
ﬂow is two-thirds. The simulations used to estimate the present value of taxes paid were carried out over
200 periods, with 2,000 sample paths for each case. The column marked Approx. gives results obtained
by applying the numerical method described in Section 4, the column marked Numerical gives results from
applying the recursive method described in Section 3 and the column marked Closed–Form gives the results
from applying Equation 12.
254.2 Allowing for Growth
The approximation developed for calculating the present value of the personal tax liability can be adapted in
a straightforward manner to allow for growth in aggregate cash ﬂows. Assume the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows follow















and ct is equal to
￿ 1 with probability q and
￿ 1 with probability 1
￿ q. Suppose taxation is proportional
at rate to. If the pricing kernel is also a geometric random walk with lognormal innovations, and ct is
independent of the pricing kernel, then the value of this process can be computed (see, for example, Berk,


















￿ is the risk-neutralized growth rate, whichis computed by subtracting fromµaconstant that depends
on the correlation between the innovations to the pricing kernel and dt. We take (45) to be the exogenous
process for ﬁrm value. We simulate this process, and, using (43) pre-tax cash ﬂows. We compute the shares
repurchased, price per share, and taxes paid along each sample path. The are averaged and present valued,
to determine a PVTAX
￿ to















Table 6 reports the results of these calculations. The number of sample paths used here is much higher
than in our earlier simulations because of the high variance associated with the random walk. The costs of
capital in this table should be interpreted as continuously compounded rates, in line with equation (45).
When contrasted with Table 4, it appears that adding growth has two effects. First, the ﬁrm’s share-
holders are more heavily taxed. The implicit tax rates and the ratio of the present value of taxes paid to the
present value of taxes under proportional taxation both are higher in Table 6. This is consistent with the
results for the certainty case, and is apparently due to the fact that the growth in the value of the ﬁrm and in
26prices erodes the value of the tax shields from the basis more quickly.
Second, the various measures of the value of the tax liability in Table 6 are decreasing in the volatility
of the cash ﬂows, s. We should interpret increases in s here as increases in idiosyncratic risk, as we are
holding the risk-neutralized growth rate ﬁxed across columns in the table. In contrast, when expected cash
ﬂows are perpetual, as in Table 4, the value of the tax liability increased in the volatility. This difference
appears to be due to the greater inﬂuence of the opportunity to pay negative taxes under the random walk
model. Since the cash ﬂows are proportional to the value, which is growing, when negative cash ﬂows occur
in this model it is more likely they will lead to large price drops below the basis of outstanding shares,




￿ 1, and 24-25% of the time for s
￿
R
￿2. For the constant expected cash ﬂow model from Table 4,
the simulations generate negative taxes only 11-12% of the time for all cases. The beneﬁts of these capital







￿ 2 No tax
Panel A: Tax rate of 28%
Value 1,836.24 2,036.54 2,067.53 2,550.33
Implicit tax rate (%) 28.00 20.15 18.93 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 7.60 7.03 6.96 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 71.95 67.61 0.00
Panel B: Tax rate of 35%
Value 1,657.71 1,903.72 1,932.46 2,550.33
Implicit tax rate (%) 35.00 25.35 24.23 0.00
Cost of capital (%) 8.22 7.40 7.31 6.00
Percent of PV taxes (%) 100.00 72.44 69.22 0.00
Table 6: Cost of Capital and Implicit Tax Rates with Negative Cash Flows and Growth:The implicit tax
rate is that rate that, under full taxation would set the present value of the after-tax cash ﬂows equal to their
calculated value. The cost of capital is the discount rate that sets the present value of of the pre-tax, expected
cash ﬂows equal to the calculated value. The percent of PV taxes is the present value of the of taxes paid, as
a percentage of the the present value of the taxes paid under full taxation. taxes paid assuming fully taxed
dividends. Calculations assume an after-tax discount rate of 6%, a risk-neutral growth rate of 2%, and that
the probability of the a negative cash ﬂow is two-thirds. The simulations used to estimate the present value
of taxes paid were carried out over 100 periods, with 20,000 sample paths for each case.
275 Conclusion
We analyze the advantages of equity ﬁnancing by comparing the present value of the personal tax liability
of equity holders in a ﬁrm that distributes all cash through dividends to one that distributes cash through
repurchases. Under certainty, where the model admits a closed-form solution, we show this advantage is
quantitatively and economically substantial.
The magnitude of the personal-tax advantage to equity under uncertainty is similar to that under cer-
tainty. This has been shown using numerical methods to calculate the value of the tax liability when cash
ﬂows are certain, and using a Monte Carlo approximation when cash ﬂows are negative, and the ﬁrm must
issue new shares to ﬁnance shortfalls.
Thetax advantages of equity at the personal level, inour model, are not sufﬁcient tocompletely offset the
tax advantages of debt at the corporate level in the setting envisioned by M&M, where all payments to debt
are fully deductible. The personal tax advantages of equity do seem to be large enough to rationalize interior
capital structures when tax shields may be uncertain or redundant, or for plausible levels of bankruptcy
costs. When combined with estimates of the marginal tax beneﬁts from debt ﬁnancing that account for the
dynamics and redundant tax shields in corporate taxation, such as those in Graham (1998), our estimates









￿ 1 be a conjectured sequence of equilibrium prices. Consider a shareholder with ¯ n shares,
and basis po. Suppose a potential buyer is willing to pay pt for these shares, and that this buyer’s optimal
realization strategy would be to sell n
￿t












￿ ¥, where åsn
￿t
￿ s
￿ ¯ n. Then it must
be the case that the price the buyer is willing to pay is less than the present value of after-tax receipts to the





























exceed the present value of after-tax cash ﬂows from holding the shares and pursuing a realization strategy
that is optimal given basis po. Denote this value to the seller as V s
￿ po
￿ . We will not show that, in fact, it















































































The ﬁrst line follows from the fact that the value to the seller under the seller’s optimal realization strategy
29must be at least as high as under the buyer’s optimal strategy. The third line reﬂects the fact that the value
under the buyer’s optimal strategy exceeds the current, conjectured price by (A1). The fourth line follows
since the conjectured price exceeds the basis, and thus the taxes paid today exceed their present value if
deferred. This inequality is strict if the interest rate is positive. The last line is the after-tax proceeds from
sale, which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 1

























Thus, the personal taxation enters the valuation proportionally. The stock price is just the above values
divided by the constant number of shares, so that the price drops with each distribution by the per-share,












When all capital gains, realized or unrealized, are taxed each period, the share price grows, and the





￿ . At the beginning of each tax period,
the shareholder’s basis is the current price. This basis is independent whether the shareholder is a buyer,
establishing a new basis, or a seller. Thus, any shareholder will be indifferent between receiving pt for her

























If aggregate ex-distribution equity value is constant through time, then ptnt
￿ pt
￿ 1nt
￿ 1, and the number of



















if we can show that, under the above laws of motion for the price and the number of shares, the aggregate
taxes paid by the equity holders under repurchase do, in fact, equal Ctp. The aggregate tax liability at time




























































Comparing (A5) to (A6) we see that the aggregate tax liability of the equity holders is, indeed, equal to
tpC.
Proof of Proposition 2
The initial value of the ﬁrm, equation (12) follows by taking the present value of the cash ﬂows in
equation (10) as in the text. Equation (13) follows by substituting equation (12) into the solution for the
31price at time t, equation (9). Substituting equation (13) into the cash constraint, equation (6) and solving for
























































































thus proving equation (14). Equation (15) follows from multiplying equations (14) and (15). To take the























































































































Proof of Lemma 2 This follows from inspection of equation (22).
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Figure 1: Present value of taxes paid, as a fraction of the value of the tax liability under full taxation of all
equity ﬂows, plotted against the personal tax rate. The three curves are associated with different values of
the pre–tax discount rate, 3% (+), 6% (*) and 9% (x).

































Figure 2: The cost of equity capital under certainty assuming an after–tax return of 6%, plotted against
the personal tax rate. The solid line is the cost of equity capital C
p0. The dashed line is the cost of capital
prevailing when distributions are paid as dividends, r
1
￿ tp.




























Figure 3: Corporate tax rates at which the ﬁrm is indifferent between debt and equity ﬁnancing, assuming
that all distributions to equity are made through repurchases. At a given personal tax rate, for corporate tax
rates above the curve plotted in the ﬁgure, the ﬁrm would prefer debt to equity ﬁnancing.





















Figure 4: Taxes paid each period as a fraction of the pre–tax cash ﬂow under certainty.





























Figure 5: Taxes paid each period as a fraction of the pre–tax cash ﬂow with uncertain cash ﬂows.
39